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Deciding for Others 
Gary M. Atkinson 
Professor Atkinson is a member of the department of philosophy 
at the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul. 
One troublesome issue in biomedical ethics concerns t he standards 
to be employed in making life-and-death decisions for those who 
cannot decide for themselves. After presenting a brief survey of some 
representative positions by way of background , I shall approach the 
question using an analytical technique developed by John Raw lSI and 
David A. J . Richards.2 Neither Rawls nor Richards addresses this 
problem directly, and I do not claim that the position labeled "the 
rational contractors" would in fact be advocated by either of them. I 
do argue, though, that that position does follow If one substantive 
moral point be granted, that the incompetent individual is a human 
being possessing the same complement of moral rights as that 
possessed by any competent person. I do not intend to convince those 
who reject that moral point but only to demonstrate what follows 
from a commitment to the moral equality of the incompetent. By 
illustrating the consequences of such a commitment, I can at least 
show when it is imperfectly carried through, half-hearted , unreflective, 
or even hypocritical. 
A. Pope Pius XII: Ordinary Means 
In 1957 Pope Pius XII delivered an address which was to set the 
parameters for the discussion even to the present.3 In that address 
Pope Pius maintained that both Christian morality and "natural 
reason" teach that an individual possesses the duty to take steps neces-
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sary for the preservation of life and health. Nevertheless, that duty is 
not absolute, for 
normally one is held to use only ordinary means - according to circum-
stances of persons, places, times and culture - that is to say, means that do 
not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. A more strict obliga-
tion would be burdensome for most men and would make the attainment of 
the higher, more important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal 
activities are in fact, subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other hand, one 
is not forbidden to take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve 
life and health, as long as he does not fail in some more serious duty . 4 
Later in his address, Pope Pius raises the question of whether a 
physician is bound to use a respirator even in cases that are judged to 
be "completely hopeless" by a competent doctor. Pope Pius answers 
his question in the negative: "The anesthesiologist has the right to act 
in this manner, but he is not bound to do so, unless this becomes the 
only way of fulfilling another certain moral duty." 5 For example, a 
physician may have promised his patient to use resuscitation and in 
this way have obliged himself to do so. But barring special circum-
stances, the physician has no obligation to employ technology where 
the condition .of the patient is reasonably believed to be hopeless. 
With regard to the rights and duties of others, Pope Pius holds that 
the doctor possesses "no separate or independent right where the 
patient is concerned," and in general the doctor can take action only 
if the patient has in some way given permission. Where forms of 
treatment are morally optional, no one is bound to give the doctor 
permission to employ them. As for the family, its responsibilities 
normally depend upon "the presumed will of the unconscious patient 
if he is of age and sui juris, " but the family is usually bound to the use 
only of ordinary means. 6 
B. Robert M. Veatch: Reasonable Refusal 
, I 
, ' 
-\ 
1\ 
) 
Although Robert Veatch agrees with much of Pope Pius's position, '/ 
there is one feature that Veatch believes "may dangerously depart 
from the patient's perspective." If a family is bound only to the use of 
ordinary means, and if such means are those that do not involve any _/ 
great burden to the patient or to others, then the family could dis-
pense with means that impose a grave burden on the family members 
themselves. Veatch is quite willing to permit a competent adult ..; 
patient to decide for himself to have treatment discontinued or not 
initiated because of its burdensomeness for others. But he opposes 
granting a similar right to decide for someone else: 
76 
While it is reasonable that concern for the welfare of others could well be 
among patients' concerns and thus [be a] legitimate basis for patients' 
refusal of treatment, do we really want to say that the physician or the 
agent for an incompetent patient can judge a treatment unreasonable 
because it is a burden on persons other than the patient (including pre-
sumably the physician or agent deciding)? 7 
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Veatch proposes, in place of Pope Pius's position, a "patient-
centered perspective" which looks exclusively to the welfare of the 
patient himself. Veatch turns his attention away from the discussion 
of ordinary means to an analysis of what would constitute reasonable 
refusal. "For the incompetent patient - the child, the mentally 
incompetent, the senile, the comatose - it would seem morally 
acceptable for the patient's agent to refuse treatment when the refusal 
would seem within the realm of reason to reasonable people. S But 
when would a reasonable person find such a refusal within the realm 
of reason? Veatch answers this question by turning it around and 
providing an explanation of what is to count as an unreasonable 
refusal: 
A reasonable person would find a refusal unreasonable (and thus treatment 
mora lly required) if the treatment is useful in treating a patient's condition 
(though not necessarily life saving) and at the same time does not give rise 
to any significant patient-centered objections based on physrcal or mental 
burden ; familial, social or economic concern; or religious belieL9 
Veatch intends this defrnition of unreasonable refusal (which in 
turn provides a standard for mandatory treatment) to be importantly 
cli.fferent in at least one respect from Pope Pius's standard. In order to 
count refilsa~ of treatment for another to be reasonable, it is not 
sufficient that one point to the grave burden for others imposed by 
the treatment. Rather, one must be able to make a reasonable case for 
saying that the patient himself would object to the treatment. Justify-
ing refusal, then, would require relating it to the patient's own values 
and not merely to the fact of grave burden imposed on others. 
C. Richard O'Neil~ Surrogate Agent 
Writing in response to Veatch's proposals, Richard O'Neil objects 
that reasonable refusal is not as patient-centered as it may appear to 
be when decisions are being made for incompetent patients: 
For what the reasonable person would find acceptable may differ from what 
the incompetent patient would choose if he were able. That is, it is one 
thing to act as a patient's agent and decide for him what is in his best 
interests. It is quite another to adopt the patient's perspective, based on 
what one knows of his past expressed wishes and interests, and choose that 
course which one believes would be the patient's choice. The former, 
"reasonable man," standard is appropriate in determining the reasonableness 
of treatment. The latter, "surrogate agent," standard is appropriate if one is 
concerned to protect the incompetent patient's right of refusal. 10 
According to O'Neil, that a reasonable person will find refusal of 
treatment reasonable does not go very far in showing that the patient, 
with perhaps his own idiosyncratic desires, would refuse that treat-
ment. The former is not patient-centered at all. 
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O'N eil believes that the surrogate agent standard is preferable to 
that of the reasonable person standard, since the former (in contrast 
to the latter) permits and indeed obliges taking account of the 
patient's oWn wishes. The person making decisions for the patient is to 
decide not on the basis of what the normal, reasonable person would 
find reasonable but on the basis of what the agent believes the patient 
himself would have wished done: 
if a thoroughly patient·centered approach is correct for the competent 
patient , I see no reason that it should not be correct for the incompetent 
patient. Incompetent persons have the same rights to autonomy as compe-
tent persons. The only difference is that incompetents must exercise their 
au tonomy by proxy. 11 
D. Paul Ramsey: Medical Indications 
Along lines similar to O'Neil's approach, Paul Ramsey argues for the 
importance of the distinction between the discovery and the imputa-
tion of a patient's values and wishes. The former would be associated 
with the surrogate agent standard, where the patient's agent attempts 
to decide what the patient would have wanted done by appealing to 
the patient's own earlier expressed wishes. On the other hand, the 
imputation of a patient's wishes proceeds on the basis of what the 
average, reasonable person could be presumed to wish under condi-
tions similar to the patient's. 
In Ethics at the Edges of Life, 12 Ramsey discusses a number of 
cases related to the treatment of incompetent adults. One, that of 
Karen Quinlan, involved a previously competent patient, whereas 
another, that of Joseph Saikewicz, involved a patient who had never 
been competent. Ramsey believes that in both cases the courts were 
operating on the basis of imputed rather than discovered wishes. In 
the former case, the New Jersey Supreme Court had written: 
78 
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if Karen were 
herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the existing prognosis 
of the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of her 
irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of 
the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural 
death .... 
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this noncognitive, vegetative 
existence to terminate by natural forces is to be regarded as a valuable 
incident of her right of privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be 
discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious 
exercise of the choice. The only practical way to prevent destruction of the 
right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best 
judgment, subject to the qualifications hereafter stated, as to whether she 
would exercise it in these c ircumstances. If their conclusion is in the 
affirmative this decision should be accepted by a society the overwhelming 
majority of whose members would, we think, in similar circumstances, 
exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to 
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them. It is for this reason that we determine that Karen's right of privacy 
may be asserted in her behalf, in this respect, by her guardian and family 
under the particular circumstances. 13 
Ramsey believes that the Quinlan decision goes a long way toward 
obliterating the distinction between voluntary and involuntary eutha-
nasia, a gap which the "euthanasiasts" have been attempting to bridge 
for decades. He writes: 
The court imputed to Karen a will to die ; it did not discover it. Then the 
court permitted others also to impu te a will to die to an uncomprehending 
patient and to act in behalf of th e patient's privacy so construed .... And 
as we have seen the court did invoke the concurrence of everyone in our 
socie ty in the conditions of human existence judged not to be worth 
preserving. 14 
A second instance of the imputation of values concerns the case of 
an institutionalized, incompetent patient, Joseph Saikewicz. In decid-
ing not to order painful chemotherapy for the 66-year-old's leukemia, 
the Massachusetts judge mentioned the quality of life possible for 
Saikewicz even if a temporary remission were achieved. Ramsey 
writes: 
The trial judge said in an interview: "I think I'd want to die. If I couldn't be 
cured, I wouldn ' t want to live." That suggests . . . a radical misuse of the 
doctrine of substituted judgment. It suggests that Joseph Saikewicz's inter-
ests were ascribed to him , not discovered .... 
[The judge] allowed competent persons to impose their own private stand-
ards of life on an incompetent, and the judge imposed his own personal 
opinion about "the quality of life that the retarded must live" and ruled 
that it was "not worth continuing when combined with pain when under 
chemotherapy ." 15 
What Ramsey objects to is the shift from a consideration of the 
length and chance of recovery, as is done with normal patients, to a 
consideration of Saikewicz's irreparable retardatiqn with his conse-
quently low quality of life. He also opposes what he considers to be a 
"misuse" of the doctrine of substituted judgment such that treatment 
for another may be refused on the basis of the low quality of life we 
believe the patient would not want. His position, rather, is that if a 
treatment would be chosen by most patients, then it should be chosen 
for the similarly situated retarded person, barring any special knowl-
edge of the patient's wishes. He maintains that Veatch's standard of 
general reasonableness, su bject as it is to the vagaries and preferences of 
pe rsons who presume to apply that standard, is an inadequate protection or 
guide in choosing treatment (or no treatment) for voiceless patients. Both 
covenant fidelity to the life and interests of another as well as the stringency 
of· fiduciary obligations of familial or medical or legal guardianship require 
that a medica l indications policy alone be applied when another, voiceless, 
human life is at stake. IS 
By a "medical indications policy," Ramsey means one that pre-
scinds from consideration of the patient's quality of life and focuses 
instead on the treatinent to see whether it is capable of improving the 
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patient's condition. Ramsey cites as an example of such an approach 
the policy of R. B. Zachary, a pediatric surgeon in England. Zachary 
does not recommend surgery if the child is dying, regardless of what is 
done or if the lesion is inoperable. The withholding of treatment is 
never based on the desire for the child to die or on the fear that the 
child would live longer with the treatment. Quoting Zachary, Ramsey 
writes, " The fundamental purpose is not to add years to their lives 
but to add life to their years.' " The improved quality of life may still 
be less than the normal. The operation may serve only to raise the 
child's level of activity from 10 to 20 percent. 
To lift one's head, and not become the object of pity, is better than no t to. 
To sit up is better than not to be able to. To get out of a chair and walk to a 
toilet is better than not to be able to. The measure is not walking a mile or 
running to catch a bus. These are the good with which surgical and ortho-
pedic procedures properly deal. 1 7 
The phrase "the good with which surgical and orthopedic pro-
cedures properly deal" is intended by Ramsey to represent the cate-
gorical rejection of quality-of-life considerations in deciding whether 
to treat. Can the patient be benefitted by the proposed treatment? 
Will the level of activity be raised by treatment? These are the only 
factors Zachary and Ramsey hold to be relevant. Ramsey writes that 
the standard for letting die must be the same for the normal child as for the 
defective child. If an operation to remove a bowel obstruction is indicated 
to save the life of a normal infant, it is also the indicated treatment of a 
mongoloid infant. IS 
E. Richard A. McCormick: 
Minimum Potential for Human Relationships 
Commenting on earlier statements of Ramsey's position,19 Richard 
McCormick emphasizes the ambiguities in a medical indications 
policy. Treatments that are not curative are said to be not medically 
indicated. But McCormick denies that there is much clarity about 
which treatments should be seen as "curative." He believes that this 
notion has many levels, and may simply mean " staving off death." He 
says he knows physicians who believe that treatments are "medically 
indicated" even when only that level of "cure" is possible. But 
McCormick notes that Ramsey himself opposed use of the respirator 
for Karen Quinlan as not medically indicated. Clearly, then, Ramsey 
does not mean "curative" in this sense. McCormick believes that 
Ramsey's rejection of quality-of-life judgments ultimately cannot be 
sustained, since one of the "indications" which must finally be con-
sidered is the kind of life prolonged by treatment. 20 
If quality-of-life considerations cannot be avoided, then the ques-
tion arises of what standard should be employed. What standard ought 
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to be used in deciding whether treatments are to be counted as "cura-
tive" or " useful"? McCormick focuses most of his attention on the 
never-competent patient, the infant or .the congenitally mentally 
defective. Presumably, for the competent patient one should adopt 
the patient's own standard, at least to the extent of permitting him to 
act on it. For the once-competent patient one should again adopt the 
patient's own viewpoint insofar as this can be determined. But the 
never-competent patient presents a special problem because there are 
no past statements to go on. McCormick writes: 
Where [once-competent adults) are involved, therapeutic and life-sustaining 
decisions can be individualized to the person. That is, the notion of " benefit 
to the patient" can be individualized. The adult has a past, perspectives on 
life and its meaning, aspirations and achievements . ... The infant is differ-
ent. The infant has no past on which to build; he has no known per-
spectives, value judgments, aspirations. He has had no life . Thus, the deci-
sion cannot be individualized to such considerations as it can in the case of 
adults. 21 
In spite of the difficulty in determining what the child would see as 
good for itself, McCormick believes that such effort must be made. 
Writing in an earlier article, McCormick makes this point: 
... it is the pride of Judeo-Christian tradition that the weak and defe nseless, 
the powerless and unwanted, those whose grasp on the goods of life is most 
fragile - that is, those whose potential is real but reduced - are cherished 
and protected as our neighbor in greatest need. Any application of a general 
guideline th at forgets this is but a racism of the adult world profoundly at 
odds with the gospel, and eventually corrosive of the humanity of those 
who ought to be caring and supporting as long as that care and support has 
human meaning. 22 
McCormick's reference to care and support that possess "human 
meaning" provides his answer to the question of discovering what 
ought to be counted as good for the child. Prec~sely because it is 
impossible to say what the child would wish, the criteria used in 
deciding whether to treat 
must be the strictest possible. That is, the very minimum potential for 
human experiencing or relationships must be seen as sufficient warrant for 
attempting to save. Any other view would be a racism of the adult world, 
and would unjustly deprive not simply one but (by logical generalizability) 
many infants of their chance at life. 23 
McCormick himself does not provide a detailed rationale for adher-
ing to a minimalist interpretation of what constitutes benefit, but on 
the assumption that the child possesses the full set of moral rights, it is 
not difficult to adduce several supporting arguments. First, it seems 
reasonable to believe that degree of happiness is correlated closely 
neither with degree of normalcy nor with absence of pain or struggle. 
People with handicaps are often unhappy, but so are normal persons. 
Since no one can reasonably predict how happy any particular indi-
vidual is likely to be, there is no basis for adopting anything but a 
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minImum level of functioning as a condition sufficient to justify the 
decision to treat. 
Second, we have already noted McCormick's point that decisions 
regarding the treatment of a child or a never-competent adult cannot 
be "individualized" or tailored to fit the patient's perspectives, value 
judgments, and aspirations. Furthermore, the value of a life to its 
possessor is never simply a function of the objective features or qual-
ities of that life but is always predominantly determined by the per-
son's subjective purposes and desires. Philip B. Heymann and Sara 
Holtz write that the judgment that the continuation of an infant's life 
constitutes a net loss, for the infant 
is, in the final a nalysis, more a m atter o f faith than o f factual knowledge. 
We do no t know anything about the individual's c rucia l " will to live." . 
Whethe r it is in the best inte rest of the pa tie nt to live always d epends 
significa ntl y on the will of the pati ent to live; it is not simply a function o f 
the situation con fronting the patie nt ... w e have no way of knowing how 
st rong a character should be at t ribu ted to the newborn. 24 
Many physically normal people display little will to live, and many 
abnormal people cling to life tenaciously. Any discrimination among 
persons in the absence of this knowledge regarding their will to live is 
the expression of personal prejudice and, again, a potential source of 
rationalization. 
Third, the adoption of a standard higher than that of a minimum 
level could be used to disguise our reasons for not treating. We don't 
want to assume the burdens of care, and so we decide not to treat. But 
we disguise our real reasons by saying that it is for the child's own 
sake that we refuse treatment. 
Fourth, McCormick refers to how nearly impossible it is for 
" healthy adults to extrapolate backwards on what ktnd of life will be 
acceptable to the [unhealthy or abnormal] infant. " 25 Even if the 
healthy adult is able to make a reasonable projection regarding degree 
of handicap (itself an extraordinarily difficult achievement), and even 
if he is not engaged in selfish rationalization, the very fact of normalcy 
creates a bias. 
Rather than looking at the question of treatment on the basis of 
whether we would be satisfied with being in a particular condition, we 
need to judge treatment in terms of the values the infant would come 
to possess were it to survive. To decide what values should be thus 
ascribed to the infant with a particular handicap, we must begin by 
discovering the values commonly shared by older children and adults 
with a similar handicap. We must not begin by asking what normal 
people would want. Although such an approach still has its problems, 
for individuals with a particular handicap do not always agree, it does 
provide additional support for adopting a low standard in assessing the 
prospective quality of an individual's life. It is no doubt true that we 
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normal people who have experienced the full enjoyment of living an 
unimpaired existence are likely to view handicaps of various kinds as 
extremely burdensome or undignified, but those who are not so for-
tunate mercifully do not always actually feel the lack we feel in 
imagination. And never having possessed these blessings, the handi-
capped do not miss them in the way that a normal person would. 
F. The Rational Contractors: Lowest Plausible Standard 
The system developed by John Rawls and David A. J. Richards here 
called "the rational contractors" is an analytic device for displaying 
the moral and social implications of the ideas of equality and respect 
for persons. Both Rawls and Richards are conscious of standing in a 
tradition that reaches back to the social contract theory of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau on the one hand, and to the concepts of moral . 
autonomy and the kingdom of ends in Immanuel Kant on the other. 
We are to conceive of a group of individuals who come together to 
choose a set of principles for their society, principles which will be 
binding on all in perpetuity and will govern their relationships with 
one another. The principles chosen will thus determine the basic 
features of their political, legal, and moral systems. Furthermore, the 
principles must be agreed to unanimously, in this way laying the 
foundation of political and social authority in the "consent of the 
governed. " 
In order to discover what principles would, in fact, be chosen by 
the contractors, it is necessary to specify the conditions under which 
the contractors would be carrying out their deliberations. First, the 
contractors are rational, that is, they choose the most effective means 
availablt to them for the achievement of their goals. Second, the 
contractors are self-centered in that they are directly concerned to 
promote only their own values, goals, and plans. In their reasoning, 
the contractors possess no altruistic or malicious motivations what-
soever. It may appear that such a condition generates a form of ethical 
egoism, but this appearance is misleaqing. We shall see that the prin-
ciples agreed to by the self-centered contractors are not themselves 
egoistic and that the motivation for any normal person's adoption of 
these principles would not be selfish. Third, the contractors are 
omniscient regarding the general features of human nature and human 
living. This condition is based on the need to relate morality to human 
good and harm. Fourth, and most striking, the contractors are 
ignorant of the particular features of their own condition, i.e., of 
whatever would bias the choice of principles in their own favor. For 
example, the Rational Contractors are ignorant of their idiosyncratic 
set of values and life plans, their age, sex, race, level of intelligence and 
other natural abilities, their health, social status, income, nationality, 
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religion. The constraint of ignorance about such features reflects and 
gives expression to the prior moral conviction that an individual's 
moral status of fundamental equality is not affected by one's values, 
age, sex, etc. 
The choice of principles, then, is made behind what is called the 
"veil of ignoran'ce." Such a condition could never exist in reality, since 
normal people cannot be unaware of these features of their own 
make-up. But the rationale for the veil is clear: if a certain fact about 
oneself is held to possess the potential for introducing unjust bias, 
then the knowledge of that fact is withheld from the contractors as 
they deliberate. Furthermore, we can enter the veil of ignorance, at 
least in thought, by the sincere (though not easily achieved) attempt 
to -exclude from our moral reasoning all considerations relating to our 
personal characteristics, beliefs, and values. 
The rational contractors are capable of sophisticated forms of 
reasoning, but this system is simply an analytic device for getting at 
the implications of the notion of moral equality. Thus, if we wish to 
analyze the belief that the mentally defective are to be treated as 
morally equal to the mentally normal, we can translate this belief into 
the requirement that the contractors be ignorant of their mental 
status: they must choose principles that will be binding on them 
whether they be mentally normal or subnormal. The same point holds 
for the question of physical defect. It is important to appreciate that 
this approach cannot demonstrate moral equality, but serves only to 
explicate the consequences of ascribing such equality. 
We are interested, then, in understanding the implications of the 
contractors' ignorance of whether they will ever come to possess an 
articulated set of values and plans. This question is addressed directly 
neither by Rawls nor by Richards. What is interesting about their 
system, though, is that they provide an analytical fra}1lework within 
which this and a host of other questions can be addressed. Further-
more, Richards (and Rawls to a lesser extent) do argue for several 
principles which provide some guidance for our discussion. 
The first of these principles Richards calls the principle of non-
maleficence, which requires that persons are not to be cruel to or 
injure or kill others, unless it is a case of necessary self-defense or the 
person being harmed or killed has rationally and voluntarily requested 
such harm or death. The principle also requires persons to take steps 
to insure that they do not harm or kill others accidentally. 26 
The rationale and justification for each of Richards's principles is 
the same: the principle in question would be adopted unanimously by 
the rational contractors deliberating as they are under the restrictions 
placed upon their knowledge. Knowing as they do the general features 
of the human condition, the contractors understand how certain 
purposes can be furthered by killing or injuring others against their 
will, so that such killing and harming can be rational, depending on 
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one's circumstances and goals. But they also understand how one is 
affected by being harmed or killed. Furthermore, the contractors are 
ignorant of their own goals and particular situation. They do not 
know, for example, whether they are strong and able to harm others or 
weak and at others' mercy. Richards believes that under these condi-
tions the rationally preferable strategy is to adopt the principle of 
non-maleficence and thus protect oneself from being harmed even 
though doing so may curtail one's freedom to harm others. The adop-
tion of the principle is rationally sound because the "cost" of observ-
ing the principle (i.e., of restraining oneself from injuring or killing 
others) is relatively small compared to the "benefit" of physical 
security and peace of mind. 
The principle of non-maleficence is a principle of not causing harm. 
Two other principles concern the positive rendering of help. The first 
of these principles Richards calls the principle of mutual aid, which 
requires one person to render assistance to another if, at relatively 
little cost to himself, he can avert or relieve great harm for another. 
The point here is that the cost of providing aid be relatively little in 
comparison with the benefit produced. 27 Great sacrifices would not 
be required by this principle, nor would the provision of slight benefit, 
though such actions would be commendable and worthy of praise. As 
with the principle of non-maleficence, there are costs associated with 
the principle of mutual aid, but these seem well worth the benefits 
promised. On the other hand, to require a person to help another 
whenever the costs of doing so are less than the benefits of being 
helped would require us to spend most of our time and resources 
helping others. Such a Herculean requirement might be acceptable to a 
pure altruist, but it would not be adopted by the contractors who are 
concerned to develop principles that are likely to assist them in the 
furtherance of their own goals. 
Third Principle Relevant 
A third principle is relevant here, one that may be seen as supple-
menting the second . Richards calls this the principle of paternalistic 
guidance, and it applies in cases where an individual lacks either the 
developed capacity for rational deliberation and choice or the oppor-
tunity to exercise this capacity. The principle requires that if this lack 
is likely to result in a substantial and irrational frustration of the 
individual's interests, then a second person should prevent such frus-
tration and assist the first to develop his capacities. 28 Again, owing to 
the balance of benefits over costs associated with this principle, the 
contractors, ignorant of their own rational capacity, would find the 
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adoption of such a principle a reasonable way of protecting themselves 
in the event of their lacking such a capacity or the opportunity of 
using it. 
The discussion of these three principles illustrates one important, 
theoretical point: although the rational contractors are themselves 
self-centered, it by no means follows that the principles agreed to are 
egoistic, or that the motivation that would lead us to adopt the 
reasoning of the contractors is egoistic as well. After all, we know our 
sex and race and so would have no egoistic motivation for discounting 
that information. Rather, we adopt this form of reasoning which dis-
counts certain kinds of information because it shows what ought to be 
done when one looks at matters from the " moral point of view." And 
it is this dispassionate and impartial point of view that is given opera-
tive expression by conjoining self-interest with the ignorance of the 
rational contractors. 
Richards 's principles of non-maleficence, mutual aid, and paternal-
istic guidance are presented by him as strict rules governing behavior, 
with a carefully worked out order of precedence to take care of pos-
sible conflicts among the various rules when they are applied in partic-
ular situations. For the sake of simplicity, we shall be considering 
principles which should be understood merely as rules of moral rele-
vance, rules that specify what factors ought or ought not to be taken 
into account in making moral decisions. The argument here will be to 
the effect that the contractors would agree to the appropriateness or 
unjustifiability of citing others. No attempt will be made here to 
resolve possible conflicts among different principles except to indicate 
that some of the principles would be viewed as having special weight 
or moral significance. The approach employed here, then, is simply 
intended to answer this question: if we grant that the infant or never-
competent adult possesses a moral status equal to tha of the normal 
adult, what factors ought we to take into account and what factors 
ought we to disregard? 
The reasoning of the rational contractors as applied to the case of 
the never-competent person runs as follows . We are to imagine our-
selves as ignorant of our age and mental condition. We know ourselves 
to be born, and nothing else. (We could examine the question of 
abortion by seeing what follows from the denial of even this know l-
edge.) We may be infants (normal or defective) or mentally defective 
adults, or we may be competent adults. If we are competent adults, 
we don't know what our values and attitudes are. We may be parents 
with children who may be seriously defective. We may be profes-
sionals assigned to the care of children or the mentally defective. We 
may be persons whose care competes for the scarce medical dollar 
with the care of the never-competent. Or we may simply be taxpayers 
who willingly or unwillingly finance public medical care. 
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(1) Rule of Special Benefit: The contractors would find it 
rationally (and thus morally required) to give special weight to the 
interests of those who have not yet experienced any (or relatively few) 
of the goods of life. The reasoning here is that the contractors would 
find it desirable to make a special effort to assure that no one fails to 
experience at least some of the joys of living. The implication is that 
the child, who has his entire life ahead of him, has a special claim on 
the help of others, regardless of his mental condition, provided only 
that his continued existence is consistent with some of the goods of 
living. This would also imply that the mentally defective adult who 
has experienced fewer of life's goods would also possess a special 
claim. Furthermore, because accurate prognoses are extremely diffi-
cult to come by and can seldom be made with certainty, the con-
tractors could find it rational to approve a policy which in some cases 
rejects unfavorable prognoses in hopes that they will turn out to have 
been mistaken. 
The implications of special benefit run directly counter, then, to 
those of an approach that would view the infant as an individual 
growing in moral worth from the time of birth through infancy up 
until childhood (or even beyond). According to special benefit, it is 
more (rather than less) difficult to "let a child go" the younger he is, a 
difficulty that is not reducible to the greater difficulty of obtaining 
accurate early prognoses. The younger the child is and the less he has 
experienced the goods of life, the more claim he has on our help. 
Furthermore, the contractors would appreciate the special vulner-
ability to which they would be subject were they an infant or an 
incompetent adult, and so might wish to adopt some sort of protec-
tion against the possibly arbitrary or self-interested decisions of par-
ents or physicians. This is not to say that parents would never have the 
right to decide about the care of their children but only that the 
'contractors would wish some oversight of parental decisions if they 
thought there was a significant risk that special benefit might be 
violated. 
(2) Rule of Qualitative Benefit: The contractors would find it 
rational (and therefore morally required) ,to adopt the lowest plausible 
standard for judging a life to be sufficiently valuable to its possessor to 
be worth preserving. This is because the contractors are ignorant of 
their own set of values, ignorant of their own crucial "will to live" 
which is so important in determining the worth of one's own life to 
oneself . Not having experienced many of the goods of life, the infant 
has formed no conscious set of values. But it is the contractors who 
must make their choice of principles, and it seems reasonable to 
believe that they would find it rational to risk a life at a level found 
unacceptable to its possessor rather than run the risk of rejecting a life 
that would have been found acceptable. Also, the contractors would 
be concerned to protect themselves from the risk of injustice arising 
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from the strong and powerful's decision regarding what is in . the 
"true" interest of the weak and defenseless and voiceless. 
In deciding what is to be counted as the "lowest plausible stan-
dard," we must appreciate that we are not presenting arguments 
intended to show that a particular standard is, in fact, correct. Rather, 
we are only showing what standard the contractors would think they 
might actually hold. The requirement here is quite minimal, and in view 
of this it seems reasonable to believe that the lowest plausible standard 
is mere bodily existence. If the person is merely being kept alive, that 
(in contrast to McCormick's view) should by itself be seen as doing 
some good. 
At least three reasons may be offered for this view. First, since we 
do not know what the alternative to life is, we do not know what 
good is being done by keeping death at bay. Death may be horrible or 
at least unpleasant, so that the mere prevention of death could consti-
tute some good. Second, a person who is thought to be unconscious 
may indeed be aware of his surroundings at least to some degree. So, 
even if the mere prolonging of life were of no value in itself, we 
cannot be certain that this is all that is being accomplished by treat-
ment. Third, it does not seem odd on the face of it to say that a 
person is being harmed by being killed even if he is unconscious and 
will never regain consciousness. If one rejects any form of dualism and 
identifies a person with his living body, then the good of the person is 
not completely separable from the living body. The first and third 
considerations may tend to cut against each other, but the point is 
that the contractors are ignorant of their own beliefs and so must take 
all reasonable beliefs into account. 
(3) Rule of Comparative Benefit: The contractors would find it 
rational (and thus morally justified) to admit comparative judgments 
of value, judgments to the effect that the quality 0 certain lives is 
higher than that of others. The reasoning here is that such comparative 
judgments are relatively non-problematic and lie at the basis of medi-
cine. As Ramsey says, "To sit up is better than not to be able to. To 
get out of a chair and walk to a toilet is better than not to be able to." 
Comparative benefit is consistent with the previous rule, for what 
qualitative benefit forbids is the adoption of a certain quality of life as 
the necessary condition for a life worth living. It does not forbid such 
things as acting to improve the quality of life by medical procedures. 
(4) Rule of Comparative Burden and Benefit: The contractors 
would find it rational (and therefore morally justified) to permit com-
parisons between the expected benefit to the patient and the cost or 
burden placed on others of providing care. Comparative burden, then, 
is simply a special application of the principle of mutual aid. If the 
contractors knew that they were going to be defective children need-
ing special care, then the prohibition of such calculations would be 
rational. But the contractors are ignorant of this and so lack the 
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information that would justify tailoring principles gIvmg absolute 
weight to the interests of the never-competent patient. Furthermore, 
the permissibility of calculating relative benefits and costs means that 
the prognosis of a high quality of life could justify the assumption of 
burdens that would not be justified were the prognosis not so favor-
able. On the other hand, the fallibility of such prognoses cannot be 
denied, and there is the danger of simply disregarding the interests of 
the weak, so we find ourselves sometimes in an uneasy tension 
between conflicting considerations. 
(5) Rule of Special Burden: The contractors would find it rational 
(and thus morally justifiable) to require certain persons to assume 
rather great burdens in the care of the weak and defenseless, parents 
and guardians in particular, without rejecting all calculations of rela-
tive benefits and burdens. The principle of mutual aid requires only 
the assumption of relatively small burdens for the production of 
significant benefit, but the contractors would find it reasonable to 
require certain people to do more. The principle of mutual aid applies, 
as it were, in a "state of nature," a duty each person owes everyone 
else alike, friend or foe, stranger or intimate. But certain conditions 
are so fraught with peril that the requirement of special help is reason-
able. The helplessness of childhood or incompetency are archetypal of 
these special situations. But parents are people, too, and the con-
tractors can only impose burdens they could live with were they 
parents. On the other hand, the contractors could justify the imposi-
tion of special burdens on parents because they have freely consented 
to become parents for the sake of the good of children and presum-
ably knowing the possible burdens of parenthood. Furthermore, the 
special burden of having a defective child could be significantly 
reduced by the adoption of programs (both governmental and 
privately run) that are designed to support parents in the care of their 
children. 
John Robertson expresses criticisms of any position that would 
permit the calculation of relative benefits and burdens, which he con-
siders to be an unacceptable form of utilitarianism: 
.. . even if such comparisons could reliably show a net loss from treatment, 
the fact remains that the child must sacrifice his life to benefit others. If the 
life of one individual , however useless, may be sacrificed for the benefit of 
any person, however useful, or for the benefit of any number of persons, 
then we have acknowledged the principle that rational utility may justify 
any outcome. As many philosophers have demonstrated, utilitarianism can 
\ always permit the sacrifice of one life for other interests, given the appro-
\ priate arrangement of utilities on the balance sheet. 29 
\ I Robertson's objection is misplaced. He confuses the judgment that 
a person's life is of little value to the person himself with the judgment 
that the person is of little use to others. The second judgment would 
indeed enter into a utilitarian calculus, whereas the benefit being con-
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sidered by the contractors is the benefit the individual derives from 
his own life. The contractors are self-centered and are not out to 
maximize utility. There are some risks it is irrational to run, even 
though running them can be expected to maximize utility in the long 
run. The point is that for the contractors there is no "long run"; they 
have only one life to lead, and they must design principles they can 
accept whatever their own condition. So, the calculations of relative 
benefits and burdens which the contractors undertake are not a 
prelude to the attempt to maximize net utility, but are rather steps in 
the process of assuring (to the greatest extent possible) that no one 
will suffer a great loss owing to the failure of someone else to shoulder 
a relatively small burden. Again, the contractors would find it rational 
to require certain key persons to assume difficult burdens for the sake 
of protecting the weak and voiceless, but that would not require ruling 
out calculations of benefits and costs altogether. 
(6) Rule of Imposed Burden : In addition to permitting taking 
account of the burden placed on others of providing care, the con-
tractors would find it rational (and therefore morally acceptable) to 
allow the providers of care to withhold treatment if it would impose 
an excessive burden on the patient himself. As with comparative 
burden and special burden, imposed burden would permit relative 
quality-of-life judgments to be used in deciding whether the burden 
imposed on the patient by treatment is excessive. What the contrac-
tors are concerned to avoid is the adoption of idiosyncratic standards 
in judging whether a life is worth living or of benefit to its possessor. 
Such judgments are fundamentally arbitrary and contain the risk of 
abuse. If a plausible case can be made for saying that a life at a certain 
level is worth living, then it is arbitrary to act on the judgment that it 
is not worth living. On the other hand, comparative judgments of 
relative value are not arbitrary, for the practice of' medicine itself 
depends on them. And it is not arbitrary to say that all lives are worth 
living but that we do more good by restoring a life to normal function-
ing than by sustaining one at a reduced level. Each life is of net value, 
but there are some lives whose levels are so low that our sustaining 
them at great cost to the patient himself is not of net benefit to him . 
It must be admitted that there is some risk of abuse here, as there is 
with comparative burden: we simply set the net value of life so low 
that practically any burden of care placed on the patient himself or on 
others becomes excessive. If the cont.ractors thought there was really 
a significant risk of abuse here, they might well reject comparative 
burden and imposed burden. But it is important to appreciate what 
would be involved in doing so. It would mean that if a most burden-
some treatment would be proposed for otherwise normal infants, that 
treatment would be obligatory for abnormal or defective humans, no 
matter how poor the prognosis, provided only that there were a com-
parable chance of survival with the treatment. The only reason that 
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could justify the adoption of such a policy would be fear of significant 
abuse. 
The presentation of the position of the rational contractors has 
not been concerned to develop specific criteria for use in deciding 
whether to treat the never-competent patient. It has dealt with a 
consideration of the factors that should be taken into account if we 
grant a commitment to the moral equality of the infant or never-
competent adult. Such a commitment involves giving special weight to 
those who have experienced relatively little of the goods of life, and it 
could require the provision of special protections to assure that the 
weak and defenseless are not subjected to injustice and self-serving 
rationalizations from others (1). This commitment to the fundamental 
moral equality of all (born) human beings is consistent with the adop-
tion of quality-of-life assessments provided that the standard 
employed is the lowest plausible one (2). Furthermore, it is permis-
sible to use relative quality-of-life assessments in deciding whether the 
burdens of treatment imposed on others (3), (4), (5) or on the patient 
himself (6) are excessive. These comparative assessments are no doubt 
risky and subject to abuse, but that does not mean that it is per se 
immoral or unjust to use them. 
I have not argued that the never-competent human being possesses 
all the moral rights of a normal human being. The principles merely 
show what follows from such a position. They can also be used to 
suggest contexts in which that thesis is not being respected and acted 
upon . 
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